Fethullah Gülen sums up some of his central ideas when he writes, “Throughout the four corners of the world, people of truth and love…are carrying messages of love, tolerance and dialogue with everyone”(2004, 174). These three concepts, love, tolerance, and dialogue, show up again and again throughout Gülen’s writings, speeches, sermons, and interviews. What I would like to do is to examine particularly the concepts of tolerance and dialogue within the context of Gülen’s thought. I will concentrate particularly on the concepts of tolerance and dialogue because it is these ideas that personally attracted me to his thought. Although it is obvious I will relate these concepts to the Western tradition, you must understand that Gülen grounds these notions firmly within his own deep commitment to and knowledge of his faith tradition of Islam. However, let me begin in reverse order starting with dialogue.
Gülen writes, “Dialogue means two or more people coming together to talk and meet on certain subjects and, by means of this, to draw closer together to one another” (2004, 171). He amplifies this by stating, “The ways to explain things to people without making them hostile and frightened should be sought. For this reason, at whatever cost, the road to dialogue with people must be kept open” (Gülen, 2004, 140). Gülen also recognizes that dialogue and tolerance are interrelated concepts. Dialogue is only possible if one is willing to be tolerant about what may be said. This does not mean that the parties to the dialogue need agree. Gülen states, “Tolerance does not mean being influenced by others and joining them; it means accepting others as they are and knowing how to get along with them” (2004, 157). He reemphasizes this point when he writes, “Being tolerant does not mean foregoing our traditions coming from our religion, our nation or our history, because tolerance is something that has existed since olden times” (Gülen, 2004, 158). The alternative to dialogue and tolerance is unpleasant. Each person, community, and nation is faced with a genuine moral dilemma between dialogue and tolerance and their alternatives. Gülen states this dilemma clearly when he writes, “People with different ideas and thoughts are either going to seek ways of getting along by means of reconciliation or they will constantly fight with one another” (Gülen, 2004, 157).
The responsibility for being tolerant and engaging in dialogue is not just the personal responsibility of the individual. Gülen notes, “At a time when the world has become like a big village and at a point when our society is on the verge of great change and transformation, if we are talking about dialogue with other nations…[then] tolerance is a matter that needs to be rewarded and for this reason it must permeate all society” (2004, 157). Thus, “universities should breathe it, politicians should frequently talk about it, people in the music world should write lyrics about it and the media should give support to positive developments on this subject” (Gülen, 2004, 157). Gülen also observes, “In countries programmed for corruption, intolerance, and mercilessness, such things as freedom of thought, polite criticism and exchange of ideas according to norms of equity and fair-minded debate, it would be meaningless to speak of products of logic and inspiration” (2004, 37). It is obvious here that Gülen is upholding the values of tolerance and dialogue. Furthermore, he maintains that dialogue itself is a logical process because it is only meaningful to speak of the products of logic out of this process.
As I noted before, Gülen bases his notions on Scripture. He writes, “The Qur’an is the source of leniency and tolerance, and because these concepts have flowed to us like an exuberant stream from the Conveyor of the Qur’an, upon him be peace and blessings, we cannot think any differently on this matter” (Gülen 2004, 155). He continues, “From this perspective, because tolerance derives from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, it is a Muslim’s natural virtue and, because of the sources it derives from, it is permanent” (Gülen 2004, 155). Now as I reflect on the religious foundation of Gülen’s ideas and the fact they solidified in his mind in reaction to the stresses that he observed in his own society, I cannot help but be reminded of the fact that John Locke’s first Letter Concerning Toleration arose in not too dissimilar a situation. Locke was all too familiar with the terrible conflicts that had beset the Christian West after the Reformation. He also found that toleration was an alternative to those conflicts. He too grounds his notion in his own religion. Locke states, “…I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic mark of the true church” (Locke 1955, 13). The fact that two men so far apart in space, time, and religion could arrive at roughly similar conclusions gives me great hope for the future of their ideas.
Gülen writes, “The Qur’an urges peace, order, and accord. It aims at universal peace and order, and opposes conflicts and dissensions. It is interesting that the Qur’an calls actions acceptable to God ‘sound actions to bring peace and order’” (2004, 214). This raises the question about the relation between peace and the key notions of tolerance and dialogue. Well, all too often in human history, dialogue has only begun after people have exhausted themselves in war and conflict. Gülen calls for us to begin with tolerance and dialogue because in such an atmosphere peace follows of its own accord. In fact, Gülen envisions a world and a new civilization growing towards global tolerance. He writes that, “Instead of a world kneaded with malice and hatred, a surprising world shaped in a climate of love, tolerance and forbearance will appear before us” (Gülen 2004, 194).
As can be seen from Gülen’s characterization of dialogue, his conception of dialogue differs in only one important respect from those of Plato’s and Habermas’. While both Plato and Habermas hold that consensus is the ideal product of dialogue, Gülen explicitly denies this. The only consensus Gülen implicitly calls for is mutual tolerance, that is, that we agree to be tolerant of each other’s views and values. In that tolerance, we need neither agree to the views of others nor accept the values of others. What he does call for is for each of us to understand the other as he or she is as a result of dialogue.
A Problem and a Solution
Fethullah Gülen is one of the few thinkers to link explicitly toleration and dialogue. Toleration has long been a topic of exploration for Western religious, philosophical, and political thinkers. We need but think of Richard Hooker, Benedict Spinoza, John Locke, François-Marie Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, and many others who have addressed the issue of toleration. But none of them tie the two notions of tolerance and dialogue together as closely as does Gülen. As we have seen, even Plato only implies that something like toleration should be a condition of dialogue; he never makes it explicit. Toleration calls for people with fundamentally different beliefs and values to coexist peacefully with each other. The main philosophical issue attached to the idea of toleration is how that principle can be reconciled with genuine moral and religious convictions that are significantly different. Of course, history teaches us that those different convictions need not be very significant, at least, from a longer perspective. But even if one is tolerant why should that person engage in dialogue with those of whom she is tolerant. In other words, what is the link between toleration and dialogue?
This problem is compounded once we realize a further dimension to the issue. The nouns ‘toleration’ and ‘dialogue’ have corresponding verb forms, ‘to tolerate’ and ‘to dialogue’. Furthermore, both verbs have illocutionary force. If we classify them according to Austin’s system, we get the following results. ‘To tolerate’ has commissive force. Austin writes, “The whole point of a commissive is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action” (1975, 157). To tolerate others is, quite bluntly, to commit oneself to put up with others who differ from us in such matters as beliefs and values. ‘To dialogue’ has expositive force. Austin asserts, “Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references” (1975, 161). These are all illocutuionary acts among a group of such acts that may occur during a dialogue. The two verbs thus reflect different illocutionary acts that are not necessarily linked to one another.
However, Gülen does provide us a link between the two notions. Out of his own experience of tolerance and dialogue, Gülen observes,
…I have had the opportunity to speak with and get to know many people from different segments of society. The most important observation I have personally made from these dialogues is how closed we are to our own society. Many times when I encountered someone who did not think as I did, I thought unpleasant things would ensue. But it is interesting that in hardly any group did I see a sour face. We were able to draw close to one another quite comfortably, and everyone who thought they were very different from each other actually warmed easily to one another. In fact, when embracing one another, everyone’s eyes were full of tears. There was no feigned flattery here (2004, 81).This passage indicates that Gülen finds the link between tolerance and dialogue in our shared humanity. He writes, “Remaining respectful to others’ thoughts and feelings because ‘they are human’, we must accept all people in their own special circumstances and with their thoughts” (Gülen 2004, 83). Furthermore, Gülen grounds this shared humanity in Islam. He notes, “God created humanity as noble, and everyone shares in this nobility to a certain degree. His messenger once stood up out of respect for humanity as the funeral procession of a Jew passed by. When reminded that the deceased was a Jew, the Prophet replied: ‘But he’s a human being’, thereby showing the value Islam gives to human beings” (Gülen 2004, 65).
Gülen’s message of tolerance and dialogue originally started as a response to certain specific tensions in Turkish society. The notions that he developed of both tolerance and dialogue fit well within the traditions of ancient Greek thought as well as more recent developments in the application of speech act theory and the conception of communicative rationality. By linking these notions as he does, Gülen supplies a unity of the two notions that has application on a global level.
References (for the excerpted section only)
- Austin, J. L. 1975. How to do things with words. Urmson, J. and Sbisà, M. (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gülen, F. 2004. Love and the Essence of Being Human (2nd ed.). Tuncer, F. (Ed.). Ünal, M. and Korkmaz, N. (Trans.) Istanbul: Journalists and Writers Foundation Publications.
- Locke, J. 1955. A letter concerning toleration (2nd ed.). Popple, W. (Tran.). Romanell, P. (Ed.). The Library of Liberal Arts. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
